In de ronde van vandaag ging DR in op 'de wil van de techniek'. Kun je dit eens nader expliqueren? Ik vind de gemaakte opmerkingen uitdagend interessant. Ik weet er niet veel van. Of Hogan dan wel The Shark het beschrevene hadden, weet ik niet. Ik weet wel dat The Shark wekenlang bovenin stond in de wereld ranking. Ik weet ook dat hij mentaal ineen stortte waardoor hij maar bleef steken op 2 majors. Maar misschien lagen daaraan wel andere zaken aan ten grondslag. Jennifer Brown van de Universteit van Chicago heeft een interessante publicatie geschreven over the Tiger Effect. Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars, Jennifer Brown
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119, No. 5 (October 2011), pp. 982-1013.
TW was, zo is me wel eens door Amerikanen verteld, een aantal jaar helemaal geen aardige man. Cruijff was ook nooit zo aardig, zo is me verteld. Tot dat je door het cordon heen kwam. Volgens mij kan je in topsport helemaal niet aardig zijn, althans, niet tijdens het sporten. Mijn simplistische aanschouwing, is dat een hele grote topper nooit heel slecht zijn sport speelt (hooguit minder goed dan de normale standaard van die exceptionele atleet), maar toch in staat is om zijn spel op een hoger niveau te brengen louter door de kracht van het mentale of force of will. fo Koepka het of dat niet heeft, geen idee. In de majors lijkt hij het wel te hebben, speelt daar de laatste jaren zeker niet slecht.
Ik geef even haar conclusie:
IV. Conclusion
While there are many situations in which tournament-style internal competition improves worker performance, tournament and contest theory
suggests that large inherent skill differences between competitors can have the perverse effect of reducing effort incentives. The main contribution of this paper is to investigate whether this theoretical possibility matters in practice. Using a rich panel data set of the performance of PGA Tour golfers, I present evidence that a “superstar effect” is in fact present in professional golf tournaments.Understanding the economic magnitude of the adverse incentive effects is also useful. Consider the following counterfactual: How much would Tiger Woods’s earnings have been reduced if all of his competitors played as well as they did when he was not in the field? In my main
results, I identify a superstar effect of approximately one stroke for players ranked in the top 200 in the world. I simulate the distribution of prizes if all ranked players’ tournament scores had been one stroke better when they competed against Woods; that is, I removed the estimated superstar effect from players’ scores. In 34 of the 136 tournaments that I studied, the simulated improvement in competitors’ performance had no effect since Woods was sufficiently alone in the score distribution
to avoid a rank-order shift. In 20 events, the simulation shifted at least one golfer into a tie with Woods in the final tournament standing; in
incentive effects of competing with superstars 1011 the remaining events, Woods shifted from a tie at a higher prize position
to a tie at a lower prize position.
My calculations suggest that Woods’s PGA Tour earnings would have fallen from $54.4 million to $48.4 million between 1999 and 2006 had
his competitors’ performance not suffered the superstar effect. By my estimates, Woods pocketed nearly $6 million in additional earnings because of the reduced effort of other golfers—prize money that would otherwise have been distributed to other players in the field. Viewed in this light, the superstar effect is economically substantial.
To understand the impact of the effect on Woods’s competitors, I ask: What if a single average player were able to overcome his own adverse
performance by exerting effort and post scores that were one stroke better in tournaments with the superstar? I simulate the total winnings
of each of the ranked players, assuming that his scores were one stroke lower in all events with Woods between 1999 and 2006. On average, a
golfer would have earned approximately $28,000 more. Given that an average top 200 player played in 12 events with Woods and earned $3.4
million from the PGA Tour during the 8-year period, the return to effort seems small. For example, in the simulation, a one-stroke improvement
by David Love III would have increased his average per-tournament earnings by approximately $10,000—considerably less than his reported
daily rate for corporate appearances. Of course, the estimates do not reflect improved endorsement opportunities that would have resulted
from better tournament play.
Still, these simulations provide compelling evidence: while the overall economic significance of the adverse superstar effect is strikingly large,
individual competitors may simply say: “Why should I exert more costly effort when the marginal payoff in the presence of a superstar is low?”
The implications of the superstar effect extend beyond professional golf; in principle, organizations in which internal competition is a key
driver of incentives should be cautious in using a “best-athlete” recruiting strategy. For example, sales managers and law firms should be aware
of the impact of introducing a superstar associate on the cohort’s overall performance. Understanding the superstar effect is a first step toward
learning how to best structure situations in which competition exists between players of very heterogeneous abilities.
De autoriteit van de leraar schaadt maar al te vaak degenen die leren willen
